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Introduction  
Since 2011, Libya has been embroiled in civil conflict, with its territory and government 
divided between rival armed factions.
1
 The conflict seems intractable, with no end in sight 
and no way to unify all of the different factions under one Libyan state. In the face of this 
chronic violence and instability, Libya’s viability as a unitary state has been questioned.2  
Is Libya a viable state? Or do Libya’s history and culture work against the success of a 
conventional, western-style state apparatus in the country? Does ‘statelessness’ in Libya hold 
the answers? 
Dirk Vandewalle defines statelessness as the systematic reduction and severe limitation of 
modern state institutions and their growth.
3
 I will explore statelessness in Libya, analysing 
how successive regimes contributed to, and even encouraged, stateless governance. I will 
assess what role statelessness has played in Libya since Qadhafi’s overthrow in 2011, and 
whether the ‘stateless’ nature of Libyan society means that unity without Qadhafi4 may be 
impossible. 
For the first part of this thesis, I will review the literature on Libya and statelessness, and how 
it fits into the paradigms of state failure, autocratic rule in Africa and post-Qadhafi Libya. I 
will then outline the poststructuralist ‘lens’ I use to analyse the ways in which Libya’s 
uniquely stateless form of government and society evolved.  
Statelessness, with its distinctive characteristics unique to Libya, is best assessed through 
poststructuralist theory. By comparison with the personal rule experienced by other African 
states, we can get a picture of Libya as a unique political and social space. This will be the 
crux of my analysis. Statelessness has created unique conditions in Libya after the fall of 
Qadhafi, and poststructuralism can help to move the discourse away from the standard 
narrative of failed states and western-centred models of state governance.
5
 
 
                                               
1
 ‘Why is Libya so lawless?’ (www.bbc.com) (06 Jul. 2016) 
2
 ‘Breakaway Libyan oil sale attempt fuels partition fears’ (http://www.middleeasteye.net/) (06 Jul. 2016) 
3
 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge, 2012) p. 2 
4
 In choosing what system to follow for Arabic naming conventions, I have elected to use Vandewalle’s system, 
outlined in A History of Modern Libya  and Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-building.  This is based in 
turn on the Gazetteer No. 41 - Libya (June, 1958), published by the United States Board on Geographic Names. 
Thus certain names are simplified or changed (Tripoli rather than Tarabulus, Qadhafi rather than Gaddafi etc.). 
5
 Leonardo Figueroa Helland and Stefan Borg, “The Lure of State Failure: A Critique of State Failure Discourse 
in World Politics” in Interventions (2014), 16, p. 878 
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Literature Review: Libya, strong men, and failure 
I divide the literature for this thesis into three themes: 1) The relationship between 
statelessness and state failure in Libya, 2) The comparison of Qadhafi to other ‘strongman’ 
rulers in Africa, and 3) Libya since the fall of Qadhafi. I discuss each theme in turn below. I 
will also outline where my theoretical framework fits into the literature on poststructuralism. 
First however, I wish to flesh out the concept of statelessness and mention the issue of 
‘tribalism’. Vandewalle’s concept of statelessness is the idea that Libya, through the 
machinations of its rulers, particularly Muammar al-Qadhafi,
6
  possesses underdeveloped or 
non-existent state institutions, such as bureaucracies and government ministries.
7
 The 
historical statelessness literature is problematic, in that it accounts for statelessness primarily 
as a side effect of the de-institutionalisation of Libyan society. While some authors, such as 
Lacher,
8
 reference ‘distrust’ of central authority, there is no comprehensive integration of the 
roles identity and power play in discussions of statelessness. The focus is on the loss or 
replacement of institutions, and the erosion of good governance in favour of unrestrained 
spending and patronage. 
 
Much of the literature on post-2011 Libya describes it as “tribal”, and is critiqued by authors 
like Cherstich for perpetuating “certain stereotypes, rather than knowledge.” 9  Terms like 
“tribalism” and “tribal” are very often used without clear definitions when discussing Libya, 
and bear “little relation to the ethnographic reality of the country.”10 Davidson argues that, 
‘tribalism’ is easily confused with ‘clientelism’, a ‘dogfight’ over the state and its resources 
between different patron-client networks, which is functionally what many western 
commentators mean when they discuss ‘tribal’ politics in Libya.11  I follow Obeidi in defining 
the tribe as an extended social unit, usually based on extended familial ties, present in both 
                                               
6
 Dirk Vandewalle, “After Qaddafi: The Surprising Success of the New Libya” in Foreign Affairs (2012), 91, p. 
10 
7
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 96-104 
8
 Wolfram Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution” in Middle East Policy (2011), XVIII, 
p. 146 
9
 Igor Cherstich, “The Libyan Drawers: ‘Stateless Society,’ ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ ‘Logic of Exception’ 
and ‘Traversing the Phantasy’” in Middle East Critique (2014), 23, p. 389 
10
 Ibid, p. 406 
11
 Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (New York, 1992) pp 206-
207 
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rural and urban areas. This tribal unit act both as a social identity and can exercise political 
authority over its members.
12
 
State failure is defined by Rotberg as the failure of a state government to deliver political 
goods, especially physical security, to its citizens, and a loss of legitimacy by the nation that 
state is supposed to control.
13
 State failure is distinct from statelessness because while 
statelessness is the deliberate or incidental failure to develop state institutions,
14
 failure is 
what happens when these institutions cease working after presumably being a desired 
component of the state itself.
15
 
The concept of state failure focuses primarily on the role of institutional breakdown, and does 
not explore the mutually constitutive roles of identity and power. It also takes the western 
concept of the nation-state as a desirable and standard model of political life, with any 
deviation from this norm becoming ‘failure’, a criticism formulated by Helland and Borg 
among others.
16
 State failure comes mainly from the state institutions themselves failing to 
carry out their basic functions, a very western-centric view of what makes one state ‘better’ or 
less ‘failed’ than another.17 Apart from brief mentions, state failure literature does not explore 
the role of countervailing local or small scale communal identities within society acting 
against the state,
18
 something Vandewalle, Davis,
19
 and others do focus on. 
Statelessness is a superior framework to state failure for analysing Libya because it moves 
away from a mechanistic view of Libya as a state whose ‘political machinery’ has stopped 
working,
20
 towards an understanding of how the inhabitants of Libya rejected and resisted the 
imposition of western style state structures, and how their rulers engaged with this 
resistance.
21
 
                                               
12
 Amal Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya (Surrey, 2001) 
13
 Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair” in Robert 
I. Rotberg (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, 2003) pp 1-3 
14
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 96-104 
15
 Rotberg, “Failure and Collapse”, p. 6 
16
 Helland and Borg, “The Lure of State Failure”, pp 877-897 
17
 Jonathan Hill, “Beyond the Other? A postcolonial critique of the state failure thesis”, in African Identities 
(2005), 3, pp 139-154 
18
 Rotberg, “Failure and Collapse”, p. 9 
19
 Davis, Tribe and Revolution, p. 258 
20
 Jurg Martin Gabriel, “The Bonum Commune Dilemma: Patrimonial State Failure in Africa” in European 
Journal of Law Reform (2006), 6, p. 491 
21
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 39-42 
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Qadhafi is the key player in Libya, both as the main architect of statelessness and as the 
longest serving ruler in the country. His 42 year rule had the biggest influence on Libya.
22
 For 
this reason, the most productive comparison to make is with other ‘personal’ rulers in Africa. 
In terms of both dependence on a single resource or ‘rent’ and in terms of the way his regime 
was centred on his will and his vision, he fits into the continuum of African personal rulers 
outlined by Jackson, Rosberg
23
 and others. 
Cooper, Davidson, Chabal and Daloz,
24
 and Jackson and Rosberg all discuss how many 
African states after independence fell into the hands of ‘big men’, who ruled outside 
institutions through systems of patronage, where state resources were distributed through 
personal networks and connections to ensure loyalty. These resources were often external to 
the state, like foreign aid and especially oil revenues.
25
 In terms of his style of rule and his 
dependence on oil revenues, Qadhafi fits into this paradigm. 
Yet there are crucial differences, especially with regards to the aftermath of Qadhafi’s fall. No 
other ruler in Africa had the combination of ideological commitment and virtually unlimited 
‘rents’ that Qadhafi did.26 Many rulers like the successive regimes in Nigeria possessed oil 
reserves and extensive reliance on patronage for political stability, but also the accoutrements 
of a state like government ministries and representative institutions,
27
 while Qadhafi worked  
to disassemble virtually all such structures in Libya.
28
  
Other rulers like Nyerere in Tanzania pursued a very particular vision, but lacked the 
resources to fully implement it.
29
 Qadhafi by contrast could afford to realise his vision of 
Libyan society laid out in his ‘Green Book’,30 made possible by the scale of Libya’s oil 
revenues.
31
 This then is the weakness of the literature on personal rule in Africa, it does not 
manage to encompass the unique combination of revolutionary ‘stateless’ ideology in Libya 
and the enabling factor of vast oil reserves. 
                                               
22
 Ibid, pp 1-2 
23
 Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, 
(Berkeley, 1982) pp 73-82 
24
 Patrick  Chabal, and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, (Oxford and 
Bloomington, 1999) 
25
 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The past of the present (Cambridge, 2002) pp 156-190 
26 John Wright, A History of Libya (London, 2010) p. 199 
27
 Cooper, Past of the present, pp 171-174 
28
 Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, “Institutional Development in Qadhafi’s Libya” in Vandewalle (ed.) 
Qadhafi’s Libya 1969-1994 (London, 1995) pp 157-175 
29
 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, pp 219-232 
30
 Muamar Al Qathafi, The Green Book (Ottawa, 1983) 
31
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 109-113 
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Jebnoun,
32
 Toaldo,
33
 Pargeter,
34
 Vandewalle, and El Fathaly and Palmer, have all argued, or 
predicted,
35
 that the Libyan state’s unique dependence on Qadhafi for its survival and 
legitimacy means that in his absence the state effectively ceased to exist. This is distinct from 
the situation with the other personal rulers of Africa, who usually leave behind a state for their 
successors to inherit or fight over.
36
 This void after the departure of Qadhafi is a new variation 
within the field of personal rule, and needs a new approach incorporating the concept of 
statelessness. 
Lacher, Jebnoun, Kuperman,
37
 Cherstich, and Gaub
38
 have all described the breakdown of 
central control in Libya and the role of tribal and regional affiliations in forming new political 
power centres. Tribal loyalties, either as a hard identity
39
 or as an ideology of convenience,
40
 
have superseded loyalty to or obedience of the central state authorities, as have loyalties to 
militias organised along local lines. All these groups seek to become the focus of identity and 
loyalty, and the main power broker, in their respective localities.
41
  
While all these authors link this localisation and tribalisation of Libyan politics since 2011 to 
the deinstitutionalisation under Qadhafi and more widely to his pursuit of statelessness, none 
of them have moved beyond institutions in any meaningful way to explore the roles of 
identity and power. Identity with tribe or state or region is mentioned, but only in the context 
of institutional legitimacy, with no discussion of how identity might be linked to institutional 
or state power.
42
 
Statelessness is not simply the absence of state institutions. It is also a mind-set and an 
institutional framework within a society which makes having no identification with a state, 
                                               
32
 Noureddine Jebnoun, “Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's statebuilding” in The Journal 
of North African Studies (2015), 20, pp 832-864 
33
 Mattia Toaldo, “Decentralising authoritarianism? The international intervention, the new ‘revolutionaries’ and 
the involution of Post-Qadhafi Libya” in Small Wars & Insurgencies (2016), 27, pp 39-58 
34
 Alison Pargeter, “Libya: Reforming the Impossible?” in Review of African Political Economy (2006), 33, pp 
219-235 
35
 El Fathaly and Palmer, “Institutional Development”, p. 175 
36
 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, p. 145 
37
 Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention: Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign” in 
International Security (2013), 38, p. 133 
38
 Florence Gaub, “A Libyan Recipe for Disaster” in Survival (2014), 56, pp 101-120 
39
 Wolfram Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution” in Middle East Policy (2011), XVIII, 
pp 140-154 
40 Igor Cherstich, “The Libyan Drawers: ‘Stateless Society,’ ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ ‘Logic of Exception’ 
and ‘Traversing the Phantasy’” in Middle East Critique (2014), 23, pp 405-421 
41 Jebnoun, “Beyond the mayhem”, pp 832-864 
42
 Ibid, pp 855-856 
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and therefore no state, possible and even desirable.
43
 This is the key gap in the literature on 
statelessness, personal rule and state failure, there is no mechanism to connect the 
deinstitutionalising and depoliticising effects of statelessness with identity and power. 
Poststructuralism, and specifically the concept of performativity can fill this gap. 
I have built on the work of Campbell
44
 and Devetak,
45
 who both outline the fundamentals of 
poststructuralism. The application of the theory by Ashley,
46
 Weber,
47
 and Helland and Borg
48
 
among others to the issues of how states are constituted and the western-centred nature of 
state failure is my departure point for my definition of state performativity, which I outline in 
the next section. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill the gap between statelessness, state failure, personal rule and 
Libya. Libya does not conform to the conventional models of state failure outlined by Rotberg 
and others, or to models of personal rule that apply in other parts of Africa by Jackson and 
Rosberg and Chabal and Daloz. Both of these paradigms are linked to Libya, but neither 
captures the situation fully. Statelessness, as a unique condition within Libya, can explain 
these differences at an institutional level, but without a firmer discussion of power and 
identity it cannot  fully explain the situation in Libya after Qadhafi. 
 
  
                                               
43
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, p. 3 
44
 David Campbell, “Poststructuralism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds) International 
Relations Theories: Discipine and Diversity (2nd ed., Oxford, 2010) pp 203-228 
45
 Richard Devetak, “Post-structuralism” in Burchill et al. (eds.), Theories of International Relations (New York, 
2013), pp 187-216 
46
 Richard Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International 
Politics” in Alternatives (1987), 12, pp 403-434 
47 Cynthia Weber, “Performative States” in Millenium: Journal of International Studies (1998), 27, pp 77-95 
and Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge, 1995) 
48
 Helland and Borg, “Lure of State Failure”, pp 877-897 
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Poststructuralism and performativity as a lens 
To answer the question How did statelessness lead to the degradation of Libyan identity and 
undermine viability of the Libyan state? I will utilise the poststructuralist approach to 
International Relations which has been applied to other areas of inquiry, like the Bosnian War 
and state sovereignty.
49
 Within such a range of possible applications, I have chosen to focus 
on how poststructuralism exposes the connection between identity and power, and specifically 
how the performance of power or sovereignty by a state creates the state, and its identity.
50
  
Poststructuralism has been described as an approach or ‘critical attitude’ towards international 
relations by Campbell.
51
 The particular focus of poststructuralism is on the ways in which 
power and identity are mutually constitutive, and how power is used to inscribe boundaries 
which help to constrain identity as the dichotomy between the self and the other.
52
 In 
particular, poststructuralism builds on the work of Foucault to focus on the ways in which the 
modern ‘sovereign state’ is constructed through the exercise of power and exclusion.53 So 
poststructuralism understands the state and identity with a state as a function of social 
processes of exclusion and the exercise of power. 
Taking this concept further, and incorporating the work of Judith Butler, several authors have 
conceived of the state as a ‘performance’ of its functions, most prominently Cynthia Weber.54 
‘Performativity’ or the repeated enactment or ‘performance’ of the functions of a state are 
what makes the state, it has no essence outside these performances.
55
 This is the basis for my 
definition of the performance of the state. 
Poststructuralist thought can make the link between the mainly institutionalised conception of 
statelessness outlined by Vandewalle
56
 and others and the more nebulous concept of state 
identity in Libya, which others like Obeidi
57
 have discussed. While many authors like 
Vandewalle,
58
 Davis,
59
 Jebnoun
60
 etc. have mentioned the seeming weakness of Libyan 
                                               
49
 Devetak, “Post-structuralism”, pp 187-188 
50
 Ibid, pp 208-209 
51
 Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, p. 225 
52
 Devetak, “Post-structuralism”, pp 199-206 
53
 Ibid, p. 192 see also Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, pp 233-234 
54
 Weber, “Performative States”, pp 90-93 
55
 Ibid, see also Devetak, “Post-structuralism”, pp 208-209 
56
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 1-5 
57
 Amal Obeidi, Political Culture in Libya (Surrey, 2001) 
58
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, p. 207 
59
 Davis, Tribe and Politics, p. 238 
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identity in passing and linked it with the stateless society nurtured by Qadhafi, none of them 
outline a specific mechanism by which statelessness can work to undermine national identity 
or promote other forms of collective identity, through its exercise of power by non-state 
means.  
Thus Poststructuralism gives us both an expansion of the existing concept of statelessness, 
and an explicit link between statelessness under Qadhafi (and before him) and the seeming 
disintegration of Libya since his fall.
61
 Performativity,
62
 and the identity/power nexus
63
 
described in poststructuralist literature are the two poststructuralist ‘tools’ I will use to expand 
on statelessness and link it to the problems facing post-Qadhafi Libya. 
By choosing to focus on the performative aspect of the Libyan state and its identity, and on 
the ways that states power and its identity are linked, I will as a result be focusing on specific 
aspects of statelessness. In particular, I will be analysing the role of institutions of state and 
political processes. Weber argues that way a state exercises power over a 
territory(institutions), and a people within that territory (political processes) are the very 
means by which that state is created.
64
  
I will assess how successful the institutions and political processes in Libya were at creating 
the Libya as a state. Did the institutions give the appearance of a functioning state, i.e. did 
they perform the state adequately? Did the political processes involve the Libyan people 
themselves in the performance? Was the identity of Libya as a state, and not simply as 
residual territory between Egypt and Algeria,
65
 strengthened or weakened by each 
performance? 
These questions will help to focus my analysis, zeroing in on the most relevant aspects of the 
Qadhafi regime, and the monarchy and colonial regime which came before it. While the 
Qadhafi years are the primary focus of the thesis, statelessness is a deep and longstanding 
                                                                                                                                                   
60
 Noureddine Jebnoun, “Beyond the mayhem: debating key dilemmas in Libya's statebuilding” in The Journal 
of North African Studies (2015), 20, pp 832-864 
61
 ‘Five years after Gaddafi, Libya torn by civil war and battles with Isis’ (www.theguardian.com) (09 Jul. 2016) 
62
 Cynthia Weber, “Performative States” in Millenium: Journal of International Studies (1998), 27, pp 77-95 
63
 Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, pp 233-234 
64
 Weber, “Performative States”, p. 92 
65
 Davis, Libyan Politics, p. 25 
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feature of Libyan society,
66
 and performativity can assess it in its historical context in addition 
to its legacy after Qadhafi. 
The institutions assessed are the primary institutions of a rentier or ‘gatekeeper’67 state like 
Libya. The major bureaucracies and the executive branch of government among others are the 
key players, and play the biggest role in the state’s performance in my framework. For 
political processes, I focus on the representative and consultative mechanisms that connect 
ordinary citizens to the ruling regime, and how much these mechanisms reflect the ways 
power was actually exercised in Libya. 
This analysis of institutions and processes is contextualised by comparison with the other 
personal ruler regimes in Africa, for the reasons outlined above. By seeing how Libya is 
similar but different to comparable regimes like the Mobutu regime in Zaire,
68
 
poststructuralism can link the uniquely Libyan phenomenon of statelessness to the more well-
known literature on personal rule in sub-Saharan Africa. Simultaneously it can help to draw 
out the very unique aspects of statelessness which make it a specifically Libyan phenomenon.  
By focusing on political processes, my poststructuralist framework can find the points of 
intersection and also of divergence between Qadhafi’s statelessness and personal rule. Many 
rulers in Africa circumvented institutional rule and suppressed political processes,
69
 but none 
did it to the same extent as Qadhafi, or in the same way. Qadhafi’s performance of Libya was 
a uniquely one man show, to a greater extent than any other comparable African personal 
ruler.  
In terms of state failure, my poststructuralist framework again focuses on institutions and 
political processes, similarly to Rotberg
70
 and others. Poststructuralism again moves beyond 
the conventional paradigm, to explicitly link statelessness as a unique Libyan mode of society 
to wider issues of western-centrism in the literature on state failure. Rotberg’s work and 
                                               
66
 Ahmida, Making Modern Libya, pp 7-12 
67
 Cooper, Africa since 1940, pp 156-190 
68
 Michael G. Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington, 1988) 
69
 Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, p. 2 
70
 Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair” in Rotberg, 
Robert I. (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, (Princeton, 2003) 
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critiques of state failure by authors like Helland and Borg
71
 provide the context for a 
discussion of how statelessness and the failure of the state post-Qadhafi are linked. 
Rotberg focuses on institutions, specifically western-style institutions of government, and 
how their failure to perform is linked to the failure of states in general.
72
 Helland and Borg 
critique this framework as being centred on western concepts of the state, which take no 
account of diverse forms of government and society in the rest of the world, and how the 
imposition of western models of governance can be a cause of state failure.
73
 By focusing my 
poststructuralist framework on institutions and political processes in Libya, I can further 
explore this disconnect between western-style nation-state institutional government and 
societies
74
 in countries like Libya. 
I apply poststructuralism to key texts on state failure and critiques of state failure in a similar 
method to my comparison of Libya with personal rule in Africa. I can find the points of 
exception where Libya does not fit neatly into these models,
75
 but also points where it does. In 
this way further insights about Libya are gained, through the application of poststructuralist 
theory. 
  
                                               
71
 Leonardo Figueroa Helland and Stefan Borg, “The Lure of State Failure: A Critique of State Failure Discourse 
in World Politics” in Interventions (2014), 16, pp 877-897 
72
 Roterg, “Failure and Collapse”, pp 7-8 
73
 Helland and Borg, “Lure of State Failure”, pp 879-882 
74
 Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden, p. 10 
75
 Matteo Capasso, “The Libyan Drawers: ‘Stateless Society,’ ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ ‘Logic of Exception’ 
and ‘Traversing the Phantasy’” in Middle East Critique (2014), 23, pp 387-404 
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Analysis: Libya and the performativity of statelessness 
I divide my analysis into three sections. In the first I apply my poststructuralist lens to 
institutions of the state in Libya both before Qadhafi and during his rule. For the second 
section I assess political processes and mechanisms during the same periods. In both parts I 
utilise my poststructuralist framework and comparisons with other personal regimes in Africa 
to draw out key points. For the final section I analyse Libya post-2011, assessing the legacy of 
statelessness and the performance of the state after Qadhafi, while comparing Libya to models 
of state failure, again to draw out some conclusions. 
Institutions and Statelessness 
Libya as a united polity was only in existence under Italian colonial rule from 1911-1943.
76
 
After the Second World War, Libya was placed under French and British administration, 
before being chaperoned to independence by the UN in 1951, under the rule of the Sanusi 
monarchy.
77
 It is worthwhile to link briefly this pre-Independence period of Libyan history to 
performativity. Devetak sees the performativity of the state as being about the marking of 
borders and fixed boundaries, which in turn fix identities as solid and real.
 78
  The area that 
came to be known as Libya had never had fixed boundaries, nor anything resembling a fixed 
identity throughout its history.
79
  
Under our poststructuralist, performative lens, the Libyan state had never been performed, and 
therefore had never existed before 1951. Under the Italians, and even before them, there were 
no institutions which covered the whole country or involved Libyans themselves,
80
 and what 
political processes there were focused on the tribal and the local. The crucial exception to this 
was the Sanusi religious order in Cyrenaica, from which the future Sanusi royal family would 
emerge. The order, and its offshoot the Libyan monarchy, would provide a regional locus of 
identity for Cyrenaica, but not for the rest of Libya.
81
 
 
 
                                               
76
 Ahmida, Making Modern Libya, pp 6-12 
77
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 34-42 
78
 Devetak, “Post-structuralism”, pp 203-204 
79
 Ahmida, Making Modern Libya, p. 7 
80
 Ingrid Tere Powell, “Managing Colonial Recollections” in Interventions (2015), 17, pp 456-459 
81
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 16-20 
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This brings us to the first part of the institutional analysis, the institutions of the Libyan state 
under the monarchy. Due to mutual mistrust between Libya’s regions, the newly independent 
state had an unwieldy federal system of government, with each of the three regions of 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan possessing a regional government which competed with 
the central government for power.
82
 In terms of performativity, the performances of the 
Libyan state under King Idris al-Sanusi were disjointed, with no clear unitary “Libya” 
emerging from the morass of federal, local and royal authority. 
 Poststructuralism tells us that identity is formed by cultural practices of exclusion,
83
 the 
differentiation of the self and the other. The function of state power is thus to inscribe 
boundaries, with the self or ‘we’ inside these boundaries and the other or ‘them’ outside.84 In 
Libya however, under the federal system, state power was used to inscribe boundaries within 
Libya itself, thus dividing Libyans into different regional groups. For the King and his royal 
court, ‘we’ meant Cyrenaica and ‘them’ meant the rest of Libya. This internal division was 
exacerbated by the King’s repeatedly stated identity as a Cyrenaican and not a Libyan king.85 
This division of Libya between Cyrenaica and the rest was made worse by the effects of oil 
and patronage networks. From the start, the institutions of the Libyan state did not represent 
the real centre of state power. This was, instead, bound up in informal patronage networks 
centring on the royal court or Diwan. The Diwan consisted of the King’s extended family plus 
leading tribal chiefs from Cyrenaica. It controlled appointments to nearly all senior positions 
within the various government ministries and state bodies, along with the funds that went with 
them.
86
  
This dynamic also occurred in many other African countries after independence. Pre-existing 
social networks like those of patrons and clients took over newly introduced state institutions, 
utilising them as another means of distributing largesse.
87
 In  Libya, the discovery of vast oil 
reserves, which began to be exported in 1959, made this problem much worse.
88
 Oil money 
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turned the entire Libyan state apparatus into a distribution network, with the government 
acting as the biggest employer for the whole country.
89
 
This performance of the Libyan state under the Sanusi was not the performance of a state at 
all, but an exercise in Cyrenaican patronage. Libya’s state institutions were a ‘veneer’, 
covering a system of patrons and clients, that was entirely separate from the state itself. 
90
 In a 
similar manner to other newly independent African states, Libya’s new state was ‘vacuous’, 
an empty shell used to disguise its fundamentally distributive nature.
91
 Using performativity, 
if a state’s identity is the sum of its institutional performances, then the fact that the Sanusi 
performance of Libya was a ‘vacuous’ performance, meant that Libya itself was a vacuous or 
hollow state, a state with no core identity. 
The centralisation of Libya’s government in 1963, to better use and distribute oil wealth, did 
not help.
92
 The influence of the Cyrenaican ruling elite was enhanced at the expense of other 
regions, and the performance of Libya through its institutions was further undermined. 
Government jobs and contracts became a form of largesse, to be distributed to favoured 
clients by unaccountable patrons within the royal family and Cyrenaican tribal elites.  
Until 1969, Libya was run in a broadly similar fashion to other ‘gatekeeper’ states in Africa.93 
‘Instrumentalization’ of weak institutions by non-state social networks,94 based on tribal or 
regional lines, led to power being concentrated on the ‘gate’ through which oil flowed. In our 
poststructuralist framework, identity is a function of power, and so any nascent ‘Libyan’ 
identity would have formed around the patronage networks clustered around this gate, which 
is to say no identity formed at all.  
Yet despite its neo-patrimonial nature, the Libyan monarchy still operated its patronage 
through the institutions of state, weak as they were. While this built no sense of national 
identity among Libyans, it at least created bare-bones institutions
95
 which could have been 
developed further under a more proactive regime. A good example of this is the successive 
military regimes in Nigeria, who tried, with limited success, to use oil revenues to improve 
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the institutions of state.
96
 In Libya however, the military strongman who came to power had a 
far different conception of the state he wanted to build. 
When Qadhafi came to power, he did so at the head of a cabal of young military officers, the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Yet from the start it was obvious that Qadhafi was 
the uncontested leader. Initially, Qadhafi moved slowly, purging state institutions, while 
leaving the crucial oil ministry untouched.
 97
 By 1972, however, Qadhafi was ready to 
implement his revolutionary programme. The outlines of this programme can be seen in his 
“Green Book”, published between 1975 and 1977. 98  The Green Book functioned as a 
manifesto and a blueprint for Libya’s revolution, describing how the ‘state of the masses’ or 
Jamahiriyya would function. 
For the institutions of the Libyan state, the Green Book called for their complete 
dismemberment. Qadhafi’s vision was for “popular congresses and committees 
everywhere.”99 What this meant in theory was the replacement of professional civil servants 
and bureaucrats with directly elected popular committees. An interesting exception was the oil 
bureaucracy, which Qadhafi carefully shielded from his reforms,
100
 comparable to other 
African personal rulers maintaining control of their ‘gate’.101 
Other African states were highly personalised at the elite level, based on patronage and 
personal relations, but they also possessed standard state bureaucracies through which this 
patronage was exercised.
102
 Qadhafi’s Libya was arbitrary at every level, and bureaucratised 
at none. The Congresses and Committees were created at the whim of Qadhafi, and had no 
legitimacy or use without him. Within the ‘low level bureaucracies’ of sub-Saharan Africa 
there existed institutions, like a civil service and security forces, which could be taken over by 
whoever emerged from power struggles at the top.
103
 In Qadhafi’s Libya, the various stateless 
institutions he created were purely a function of his own personal will.  
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No other leader in Africa attempted such change in the structure of their states, let alone 
succeeded in the attempt. Assessing this revolutionary experiment through performativity, we 
can say that, in the absence of Mobutu for example, the performance of the Zairian state lost 
its main actor, but in the absence of Qadhafi, the Libyan state itself was lost.
104
 Throughout 
his rule, Qadhafi continually changed his system of popular committees and congresses, 
introducing new revolutionary committees to police the popular ones, interfering with the 
work of local congresses, and generally making sure that the system was never settled or even 
understandable.
105
 
This performance of the Libyan state under Qadhafi was not a performance of a state at all. It 
was a performance of statelessness, a symbolic representation of Qadhafi’s idealised 
revolutionary state. Weber argues that the performance or ‘representation’ of a state is a 
function of its government or governing institutions acting as a ‘signifier’ or indicating the 
existence of the source of its authority, the ‘domestic community’.106 Yet in the case of Libya, 
Qadhafi’s revolutionary institutions signified a domestic community that did not exist. 
Thus statelessness became a performance of nothing, a signifier of an imagined community of 
‘the masses’ which had no relation to the actual community of ordinary Libyans. This 
disconnect between Qadhafi’s performance and the people he ruled was made worse by the 
‘bifurcation’ of Libya. Increasingly over the course of Qadhafi’s rule, how power was 
officially exercised and how it was actually exercised diverged.
107
 Popular rule in theory 
meant that the people governed themselves through the popular committees and people’s 
congresses. In practice Qadhafi, while occupying no official position within the civilian 
government, actually ran the country, making all key decision which were then implemented 
by the popular institutions.
108
  
Another aspect of bifurcation was the growth of patronage networks, whose existence was 
enabled by Libya’s vast oil wealth. While the people’s committees and congresses were 
responsible for administering various welfare and other redistributive programmes, the state 
had also in principle taken over all private enterprise as well.
109
 What this meant in practice 
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was that Libyans who worked within the popular institutions became ‘rent-seekers’, 
occupying a job purely for its wage and not for any productive purpose. In turn these rent-
seekers redistributed wealth through family and tribal connections to others.
110
  
Statelessness thus was a twofold performance. On the one hand Qadhafi officially continued 
to perform the show of Libya as a ‘state of the masses’, run through direct democracy, in a 
continual popular revolution. On the other hand, the actual performance of power in Libya 
was through patronage and tribal connections, especially in the 1990’s when Qadhafi 
switched to making tribes the cornerstone of the revolution.
111
 Tribal leaders entered the 
popular institutions, thus combining their informal role with the formal structures of the 
revolution. The official, visible performance of Libya was mirrored by the unofficial and 
invisible performance of actual, tribal power and authority. When Qadhafi fell, he took the 
official performance with him, leaving only the unofficial, tribal and local performance, and 
hence a tribal and local state.
112
 
Taking the performance of the state as the performance of the state’s power, Qadhafi, by 
emptying the official performance of the Libyan state of any real power and instead focusing 
it into the unofficial, patronage and tribal-network based performance, effectively helped to 
fix the locus of Libyan identity at the tribal level. To follow Devetak’s analysis, if identity is 
fixed through the use of power to demarcate boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’, then 
identity follows power. So, if power in Libya flowed towards the tribal and local level, 
facilitated by patronage networks, then it follows that identity also flowed away from the state. 
In the presence of a stateless state, Libyan’s turned to more traditional tribal links for 
identification and security,
113
 a key component of Devetak’s identity/power nexus.114 
Oil was the key factor in allowing Qadhafi to pursue his stateless project as long as he did.
115
 
It was also a major factor in exacerbating statelessness, as easy money negates the need for 
economic planning and allows those in power to distribute largesse to their clients and 
families without fear of consequence, reducing the need or desire for reforming or 
strengthening institutional governance.
116
 While Libya was similar to many other ‘rentier’ 
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states, especially those in Africa, Qadhafi’s revolutionary fervour went further than any other 
comparable figure with access to external rents or possessed of revolutionary fervour.  
It is instructive to compare Qadhafi’s regime to others in Africa, especially in terms of 
revolutionary ideology and damage to state institutions. A comparable revolutionary figure 
might be Julius Nyerere in Tanzania,
117
 who brought his socialist revolution to the country 
around the same time Qadhafi was bringing his to Libya. Yet even under Nyerere, institutions 
of governance in Tanzania were maintained, despite his wide-ranging changes to society.
118
 
Nyerere’s performance of the Tanzanian state might have been different from other African 
rulers, but it was still fundamentally a performance of Tanzania as a state. Revolutionary 
fervour did not replace viable state institutions, and the Tanzanian state endured after Nyerere 
was gone,
119
 unlike Qadhafi’s Libya. 
In terms of damage to the viability of a state, the closest comparable example is Zaire under 
Mobutu Sese Seko. The Mobutuiste state
120
 was characterised by competition among ethnic 
minorities for access to the resources of the central state, within the system of single party rule 
and ‘cult of personality’ cultivated by Mobutu.121 Like Qadhafi, Mobutu was the sole key 
figure upon whom all others were dependent. Patronage networks clustered around the 
‘President-Founder’ in the same way they did around ‘Brother Leader’. 
Yet there are important differences, where Qadhafi went beyond Mobutu or any other African 
autocrat. The first difference is that unlike Mobutu,
122
 Qadhafi did not promote or try to 
implement a single, unitary Libyan national identity. Instead, he experimented variously with 
Arab Nationalism, pan-Africanism, his own unique brand of revolutionary ideology and in the 
second half of his rule, a return to tribal identity.
123
 The other major difference is that Mobutu 
utilised state institutions to exert his dominance and exact wealth from the Zairian people.
124
 
Qadhafi, on the strength of oil revenues,
125
 completely replaced all state institutions in Libya 
with his own revolutionary versions, effectively extending his cult of personality into the very 
structure of the state itself, and, therefore, after he fell, his stateless state fell with him. 
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Political processes, identity and statelessness 
Campbell places identity firmly within the context of exclusion through constructive power: 
Identity is created through the use of power to construct boundaries between the self and the 
other.
126
 Yet boundaries can also circumscribe the use of power, and this is what our 
poststructuralist lens can help us to examine in Libya. 
Right from the very start, the people of Libya were excluded from political power and 
involvement by the ruling elites. Under the monarchy this exclusion was official. Political 
parties were banned after the 1952 elections, and from then on King Idris ruled largely 
through decree, appointing cabinets and enacting legislation at his own discretion.
127
 Along 
with this neutering of representative political bodies, the royal Diwan (court) interfered with 
political processes
128
 as well as the country’s institutions as outlined above.  
The unaccountable but hugely influential Diwan consisted almost entirely of Cyrenaican tribal 
heads, key families and members of the extended Sanusi royal family.
129
 This small, elite 
group monopolised cabinet posts and other key positions within the government, while 
interfering with the work of successive prime ministers and forcing them from office.
130
 Thus 
the already weak connection between Libya’s government and its people was overridden by a 
provincial minority, reinforcing the divide between the regions discussed above. 
In this way the political performance of the Libyan state was as incomplete as the institutional 
one previously described. By banning political parties and political dissent,
131
 the Kingdom of 
Libya laid the groundwork for Qadhafi’s state of the masses. The same authoritarian 
tendencies and practices that had defined the monarchy would become part of Qadhafi’s 
revolutionary regime. 
Treating performance in the sense of political processes as the display of state power, it is 
clear that Libyan identity concentrated more towards regional manifestations under the 
monarchy. The political performance of power excluded the great majority of people outside 
Cyrenaica, and so excluded their identity as Libyans. 
                                               
126
 Campbell, “Poststructuralism”, p. 234 
127
 Vandewalle, Modern Libya, pp 45-50 
128
 Ibid, p. 49 
129
 Ibid, pp 59-75 
130
 Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution (Middlesex, 1974), pp 80-81 
131
 Wright, Libya, pp 178-182 
Student No. 1729160 
21 
 
Weber, in an interesting application of the concept of performing or ‘writing’ a sovereign 
state as she puts it, talks about how political representation is a process of ‘writing’ the people 
within a state.
132
 Adapting this concept to performativity, it can be said that the purpose of 
political representation is to perform a specific ‘people’ or citizenry. So a Libyan government 
represents and therefore ‘writes’ or performs the Libyan people. 
What actually happened in Libya, however, was that the successive governments did not 
perform the Libyan people but instead performed different sectional or ideological groups. So 
the monarchy, in both its public functions like the cabinet and its private patronage functions 
like the Diwan,
133
 represented and hence ‘performed’ the people of Cyrenaica, but not the 
people of Libya.  
Taking this notion of performing the people within a state as part of performing the state itself, 
it can be seen that the Libyan people have never really been performed. After monarchy’s 
regional performance came Qadhafi, who moved beyond both regionalism and Libya itself, in 
his quest for Arab unity across state lines.
134
 Thus the Libyan people have rarely been 
performed in their history as an independent nation, leaving them with a weak and ill-defined 
vision of what it means to be a Libyan.
135
 
The most important sources of identity within Libya, according to Obeidi, are Islam and 
Arabic identity.
136
 This can be explained by the historical importance of Islam as an historical 
source of identity in Libya,
137
 and by the growth of Arab nationalism across the Arab world in 
the 1950s and 60s, including in Libya.
138
 Qadhafi took these two strands and wove them 
together with his own revolutionary ideology, yet much like the idiosyncratic institutions of 
governance he created, his politicised Libyan identity centred on him alone, and ceased to 
exist once he was gone. 
Qadhafi’s nebulous revolutionary political system and his constantly changing rhetoric about 
Libyans as the vanguard of various Arab, socialist and African revolutions kept changing the 
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definition of who Libyans were.
139
 Qadhafi never performed ‘the Libyan people’ or the 
Libyan state. Who the Libyan people are is a question that has yet to be answered since his 
fall.
140
 
This lack of performance, leading to a lack of national identity, was due both to institutional 
and to political failure. Much like the control of state institutions by ‘the masses’, the 
representative bodies Qadhafi established, his ‘direct democracy’, ended up as a cover for 
patronage networks and his own unofficial dominance of the country. While Qadhafi, in the 
first part of his Green Book, decried how conventional representative democracy isolated 
people from their government,
141
 this is in fact exactly what happened. 
Theoretically, within Qadhafi’s Libya, a series of interconnected people’s congresses and 
committees decided all matters of importance. Local congresses in each district or city sent 
delegates to larger regional conferences, which in turn sent delegates to a national conference, 
which then formulated government policy. In theory, decisions flowed up the chain from the 
local level where policy was decided by public meeting and consensus all the way to the 
national level.
 142
   
What actually happened was that the myriad array of different congresses and committees 
created administrative chaos without really accomplishing anything, leaving Qadhafi himself 
as the sole indispensable person needed to keep the system running.
143
 A small elite circle 
surrounding Qadhafi monopolised power at the top of this revolutionary structure, actually 
running the country and making decisions and, not incidentally, accumulating significant 
wealth for themselves and their families.
144
  
The lack of direction and general disorder of the political system was made worse by the 
introduction of the revolutionary committees. Designed to mobilise the Libyan people in the 
cause of the revolution, the committees destabilised an already unwieldy structure. They 
answered directly to Qadhafi and were unaccountable to anyone else. They undermined the 
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very popular political organs Qadhafi had created, as he worked to prevent the emergence of 
any kind of threat from any group whatsoever.
145
 
Returning to performativity, Qadhafi’s Libya was equally disjointed from a political as from 
an institutional standpoint. Building on Weber’s conception of ‘writing’ the people within a 
state through political representation,
146
 we can say that Qadhafi’s political performance of 
statelessness in Libya failed on two counts. First, it failed to perform adequately the state 
itself, because the incoherent revolutionary and popular committees and congresses did not 
function and simply negated one another. Secondly, the performance did not constitute a 
Libyan people, as its various parts did not represent or empower anyone except the narrow 
elites surrounding Qadhafi. Qadhafi’s stateless revolution involved neither the state nor the 
people in running Libya.
147
 
The revolutionary committees, being unelected bodies whose membership was determined 
through connection to key members of Qadhafi’s inner circle,148 amplified the failings of the 
entire system of popular rule. We can use Campbell’s formulation of performativity, whereby 
the performance of a state through its politics and institutions actually constitutes both the 
subject (the state) and the object about which the subject speaks (the people).
149
 So we can see 
that Qadhafi’s unique state performance, which depended on him for its continuation and had 
no existence without him, failed to fix either the existence of the Libyan state or the identity 
of its people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
145
 Djaziri, “Creating a New State”, pp 189-195 
146
 Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, p. 28 
147
 Vandewalle, Libya since Independence, p. 106 
148
 Djaziri, “Creating a New State”, p. 192 
149
 Campbell, “Poststructuralism”,  p. 235 
Student No. 1729160 
24 
 
After Qadhafi: State failure and the failure of statelessness  
With the end of Qadhafi, his centrally (mis)directed statelessness came to an end. His legacy, 
a state with no functional institutions nor even a culture of institutional governance, was 
actually seen by some commentators, even Vandewalle himself, as a potential advantage.
150
 
Yet the aftermath of the revolution to topple Qadhafi has not borne out these happy 
predictions.
151
  
The tribal and local power structures that grew up under Qadhafi, both from his 
encouragement and as a response to his stateless policies, have come to the fore after his fall. 
These structures are mostly based around specific tribes, families, and local areas or cities like 
Misrata.
152
 They seek to fill the security vacuum in the country and to secure control of oil 
revenues,
153
 reflecting a clear rejection of control or protection by any central state authorities.   
The failure to create a working state in post-Qadhafi Libya does not reflect an inability to 
build institutions a lá state failure.
154
 Rather it reflects the fact that these new institutions are 
being grafted onto a society that, after the depredations of the Qadhafi years and previous to it, 
is inherently stateless. The Libyan people have internalised the performance of statelessness. 
In a similar manner to many African societies after independence, nation-state institutional 
structures were imposed from above in Libya, onto underlying social structures which were 
fundamentally unsuited to them. In response to this imposition, patronage networks and 
‘clientelism’ grew within the state institutions, based on these pre-existing social 
connections.
155
 In Libya this process has been even more extreme, reflecting the flow of 
power and identity under Qadhafi.  
As shown above, Qadhafi’s disjointed stateless performance saw power flow officially and 
unofficially away from the central state towards local power structures, mainly tribal ones. 
With this power went identity, so that now tribal identity outweighs Libyan identity, while the 
common Islamic or Arabic identity is too vague to provide an alternative locus.
156
 Even taking 
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Cherstich’s view that tribalism is more of an ideology rather than an identity, to be used when 
practical,
157
 one can say that in Libya today tribalism is the most practical response to the 
situation. 
Tribal loyalties and actions are a practical response in post-Qadhafi Libya because, to 
paraphrase Cooper, with the oil revenues and the ‘gate’ of government which controls them 
up for grabs, the stakes involved in controlling the central authority are too high.
158
 Tribal and 
local groups are unwilling to risk surrendering power to the state, for fear of what might 
happen if a rival group gains control,
159
 especially if they gain centralised control of oil 
revenues. 
Through poststructuralism, what we see is a reversal of the relationship of power and identity 
from the Qadhafi years. Whereas under Qadhafi, power flowed to local and tribal structures, 
and so identity coalesced around these structures. After Qadhafi, identity has remained with 
the tribes, and so power is drained away from the central state towards the tribes and militias. 
From identity following power we have moved to power following identity. 
This is where the model of state failure breaks down. Institutions alone are useless, if they are 
seen primarily as a tool for one group to dominate others, by gaining control of the central 
authorities.
160
 Just as in other African countries, society ‘captured’ the state, adapting state 
institutions and political processes,
161
 the same process can be seen in Libya after Qadhafi. 
The inability to form even a unitary government, let alone for that government to start 
exerting control over the various armed groups
162
 is evidence enough that western-style state 
structures imposed from above are not effective. 
In this regard, Libya is comparable again to several other African states. Somalia and the 
DRC (former Zaire) spring to mind. I would argue that while Qadhafi was a unique ruler with 
a unique performance of rulership as outlined above, Libya after his fall is absolutely 
comparable to other cases, especially Somalia. Despite their different roads to internal 
division and conflict, Somalia having fallen apart much earlier, both countries exhibit 
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similarities. In particular, both suffer from internal conflicts driven by divisions along 
localised tribal/clan lines,
163
 coupled with strong resistance to any form of central authority. 
Yet as previously mentioned, in Libya the complicating factor is oil, which remains the focus 
of much of the violence.
164
 Another key difference is that while Said Barre was toppled 
through internal divisions,
165
 Libya’s collapse was precipitated by western support for the 
rebellion against Qadhafi, which arguably proved to be the key factor in his fall.
166
 
Regardless of these diverse circumstances, Libya and Somalia both present similar warnings 
about the dangers of imposing western-style institutions and western interventions on 
countries. Both are examples of the nature of power and its function inscribing identities, 
particularly within the discourse of international relations itself. I mentioned above how 
power serves to create identity by inscribing the boundary between self and other. Western 
practitioners of international relations often discuss the ‘failure’ of countries like Libya, and 
talk about upholding the ‘western model’ of statehood and institutions within them.167  
We easily fall into the discourse of  portraying Libya, and Africa generally, as an inferior, 
disordered space compared to the west, in order to reaffirm western dominance and 
hegemony.
168
 Poststructuralism’s greatest contribution to discussing Libya may be to help 
practitioners and theorists of international relations reassess the structures of power that 
influence their work and to see new possibilities. 
 
  
                                               
163
 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, pp 84-85 
164
 ‘Political rivalry puts Libya’s oil lifeline at risk’ (www.ft.com) (02 Jul. 2016) 
165
 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p. 85 
166
 Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention: Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign” in 
International Security (2013), 38, pp 105-136 
167
 Christopher S. Chivvis, “Libya and the Future of Liberal Intervention” in Survival (2012), 54, p. 89 
168
 Zubairu Wai, “Neo-patrimonialism and the discourse of state 
failure in Africa” in Review of African Political Economy (2012), 39, pp 27-43 
Student No. 1729160 
27 
 
Conclusion 
It is understandable that ‘Libyan identity’ is at once both a deeply contested concept and also 
seemingly absent when it comes to how Libya actually works.  Libyans in many cases look 
first to local, tribal and familial structures, not just for support but for authority, and so these 
social structures take over the role of the state. Armed groups based on these local lines 
emerged following Qadhafi’s fall, and have provided the primary source of authority and 
indeed the primary performance of state functions. 
Devetak, in his discussion of how state identity is formed, talks about the necessity to 
‘normalize’ a population to the idea of being part of a state.169 Successive rulers in Libya 
failed to do this, and as a result there is no ‘normal’ for Libyan identity. Indeed Qadhafi may 
have actually normalised the population to the idea that the state is unnecessary, or worse, a 
threat.
170
 
Earlier in this thesis we asked: How did statelessness lead to the degradation of Libyan 
identity and undermine viability of the Libyan state? Statelessness degraded Libyan identity 
because it ended the performance of the state which, as poststructuralism tells us, ends the 
state itself. What replaced the state was a chaotic system of revolutionary and popular 
organisations with no clearly defined legitimacy or function outside of Muamar al-Qadhafi’s 
own mind. Qadhafi’s performance of the state was at its heart a performance of Qadhafi. 
When he died, his performance died with him, leaving nothing of the state he tried to build.  
More importantly, Qadhafi’s pursuit of statelessness removed the performance of the state as 
a locus for Libyan identity. Libyan people focused instead on their identities as Arabs, as 
Muslims and as members of a tribe or other localised groupings.
171
 As a result, rebuilding the 
Libyan state requires far more than new institutions. It requires a performance of the state that 
places real power and accountability with its institutions, in order to create boundaries of 
identity which include all Libyans. Yet with deeply embedded networks of tribal ties and 
patronage, all of which Qadhafi encouraged, this kind of institutional, western-style change 
may not be viable. Such is the unique nature of statelessness, and its effects on the 
performance of the state in Libya. Until more is understood about statelessness, and in 
particular its performative aspect, Libya will remain an anomaly in international relations. 
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